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The paper discusses the stabilizing potential of fiscal policy in a dynamic general-equilibrium 
model of monetary union. We consider a small open economy inside the currency area. We 
analyze the demand and supply effects of direct taxation, indirect taxation and government 
spending and derive optimal simple rules for fiscal stabilization of a technology shock. Fiscal 
policy achieves substantial macroeconomic stabilization. Simple public-expenditure rules 
show the highest degree of both output and inflation stabilization. The implementation lag 
substantially weakens output stabilization, but hardly affects the stabilization of prices. Out-
put-oriented rules imply less instrument inertia than inflation-dominated rules. The implemen-
tation lag leads to higher coefficients for inflation relative to output in the optimal rule. Com-
pared to the single-instrument approach the simultaneous optimization of two instrument rules 
implies only little additional stabilization gains. 
JEL classification: E 37, E 62, F 41            
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1 Introduction 
This paper investigates the potential of fiscal policy to stabilize output and inflation. We con-
sider a small country inside a monetary union and model the dynamics of output and inflation 
in an inter-temporal optimization framework. We assume perfect capital and goods market 
integration inside the union, i.e. an integrated capital market with perfect risk sharing and a 
lack of trade barriers. This setting implies that the law of one price holds inside the monetary 
union. To keep the model simple and to focus our analysis we disregard financial and trade 
linkages between the monetary union and the rest of the world.  
    The model combines inter-temporally optimizing behavior of households and firms 
with nominal rigidities. We assume infinitely-lived Ricardian households and the absence of 
liquidity constraints. The deficit approach regards fiscal policy as rather impotent in this case, 
as it does not imply strong income effects of taxation. Fiscal instruments have strong substitu-
tion effects in this environment, however, which affect the behavior of inter-temporally opti-
mizing agents and the supply and demand side of the economy.     
    In previous work (vgl. Herz et al. 2005), we have considered a small open economy 
under fixed exchange rates, but without a monetary policy that actively stabilizes the macro 
dynamics of the rest of the world, or the union aggregate. In this case, equilibrium uniqueness 
in the small economy requires active fiscal stabilization. This paper modifies the approach 
and focuses on the situation, where monetary policy stabilizes the currency union aggregate. 
Fiscal policy is not required for equilibrium uniqueness in this case. But it remains a success-
ful tool to reduce cyclical fluctuations and to dampen the impact of asymmetric shocks, or the 
asymmetric transmission of union-wide disturbances at the national level. 
    We build our analysis on the Galí/ Monacelli (2005) model of monetary and fiscal 
policy in monetary union and extend the framework in four directions. We adopt a more gen-eral specification of utility, and we increase the number of fiscal instruments. Instead of limit-
ing the discussion to government consumption as in Galí/ Monacelli (2005) we also investi-
gate the demand- and supply-side effects of direct and indirect taxation and their stabilizing 
potential. Thirdly, we investigate the impact of an implementation lag on the stabilizing per-
formance of fiscal policy. Fourthly, we consider the combination of fiscal instruments and 
simultaneously optimal instrument rules.                        
2 Model 
This section illustrates the impact of fiscal policy on the optimizing behavior of households 
and firms. We examine the demand and supply side effects of distortionary taxation and of 
government consumption in a small open economy. We build our discussion on the small 
open economy framework for monetary policy analysis developed in Galí/ Monacelli (2002) 
and on the Galí/ Monacelli (2005) model of monetary union. Looking at a monetary union 
allows us to disregard nominal exchange rates and their impact on the terms of trade. Stabiliz-
ing the aggregate monetary policy furthermore anchors the output and inflation dynamics of 
the small country inside the union. There is no feedback from the small economy to monetary 
union, on the other hand. The impact of the small country on the aggregate variables and on 
monetary policy is assumed to be negligible.    
2.1 Private households 
The representative household has infinite lifetime. Its overall utility equals the discounted 
sum of period utility       
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where C  is consumption,   is the utility derived from government consumption, and  ) ( t G F N  
measures working time. The parameter ϑ  quantifies the relative weight of foregone leisure, 
 the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and   the elasticity of labor supply. We 
assume monopolistic competition in goods markets and a competitive labor market. Overall 
consumption utility is a CES function of domestic ( ) and foreign commodities ( ) 
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where η quantifies the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic commodities. 
The optimal consumption plan implies  
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It gives the approximated log-linear demand functions 
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where  X X x t t ln ln ˆ − ≡ indicates the percentage deviation of a  variable from its steady 
state value
t X
X . Inserting the equations (4) in (3) gives  
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as the price level of domestic household consumption. The log-linear approximation around 
  4the steady state reads 
(5)   () t F t H t p p p , , ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ α α + − = . 
When  , the share of imports in domestic consumption equals  t F t H P P , , = α . The latter thus 
indicates the country’s openness to trade in the steady state. Domestic and imported goods are 
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with ε  as the elasticity of substitution between varieties in each bundle.  
    We assume full access of private households to asset markets and perfect risk diversi-
fication. The flow budget constraint of the representative household equals 
(7a)  .       t t t t t
c
t t t t t
w
t B i B C P T D N W ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 + − + + = + + − + τ τ
t W  is the nominal wage per unit of labor and   the tax on labor income.   nominal profits 
from firm ownership, whereas   are net lump-sum transfers from the government to the pri-
vate households. The nominal expenditure on consumption equals  . It is com-
posed of the expenditure for domestic goods   and foreign commodi-
ties . The expression 
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t C P , , ) 1 ( τ + t t t B i B ) 1 ( 1 + − +  gives the investment in one-period bonds 
in period t, with   as a composite of risk-free domestic and foreign assets. To 
simplify the model we do not include physical capital as a factor of production. 
F H B B B + ≡
    An equivalent budget restriction holds for the foreign households. Designating foreign 
country variables, i.e. the union aggregate, by an asterisk we obtain  
  5(7b)  . 
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The representative household maximizes utility (1) and (2) under the budget constraints (7a) 































































































where we assume behavioral similarity between domestic and foreign households in the sense 
that   and  . 
* β β =
* σ σ =
   With 
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≈ + − +  we obtain the Euler equations  
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for private household consumption around the steady state.  
    The optimal domestic and foreign labor supplies in competitive labor markets are   
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  6The equations (10) indicate that increases in the tax rate on income and consumption reduce 
the real wage and the labor supply.       
    The integrated capital market with a common monetary policy implies  . Equat-
ing the optimality condition (8a) and (8b) gives us 
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 is constant in the steady state. Under symmetric 
initial conditions, i.e. with an equal initial endowment and steady-state consumption of do-
mestic and foreign households, it is equal to one. Under perfect international risk sharing we 


































between domestic and foreign household consumption. It indicates a negative relationship 
between relative prices and tax levels, on the one hand, and relative consumption levels, on 
the other hand. The higher domestic consumer prices are compared to the rest of the union, 
the lower is private domestic consumption relative to the union average.           
2.2 Government sector 
The government taxes labor and consumption, pays lump-sum transfers and purchases com-
modities. In addition to distortionary and lump-sum taxation the government can issue one-
period bonds to finance public expenditure to balance its budget. In nominal terms the gov-
  7ernment budget constraint reads 
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as transversality condition. This condition 
implies that the government cannot run Ponzi schemes and private households do not waste 
part of their wealth. All public debt must eventually be repaid.  
    With regard to public demand we assume that all government consumption   goes to 
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that the optimal allocation of public demand on each variety h equals  .   () t t H t h t h G P P G
ε − − =
1
, , ,
    An equivalent budget constraint and an equivalent transversality condition hold for the 
monetary union aggregate. Again we assume that public demand is entirely devoted to home 
country production, i.e. that governments do not consume imported goods. The assumption 
implies that foreign private consumption is the only source of export demand.      
2.3 The monetary union 
In order to keep the model simple we assume that the monetary union consists of open 
economies, but that it is closed vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The small open member econ-
omy has no notable impact on the union aggregate. There is thus no feedback from the small 
country to the union, neither with regard to exogenous shocks nor with regard to policy. Ag-
gregate demand in the union thus amounts to  . With 
* * *
t t t G C Y + =
Y
G
≡ γ  as the steady state 
share of public demand in total output we obtain the log-linear demand equation 
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Replacing   by equation (10b) and, subsequently,   by the expected value from equa-






































as the inter-temporal aggregate demand equation for the monetary union. 
    To simplify the supply side of the model, we assume that firms produce output with 
constant returns to scale and labor as the only factor of production. Each firm produces a vari-
ety according to  t f t t f N A Y , , =  and  t h t t h N A Y , , =  respectively. The aggregate production func-
tion can be approximated at first order as  t t t n a y ˆ ˆ ˆ + = .
1 The combination of monopolistic 
competition in goods market and staggered forward-looking price setting (see Calvo 1983) 
gives us the New Keynesian Phillips curve  
(15)    
* *
1
* ˆ ˆ ˆ t t t t c m E λ π β π + = +
with  , describing the dynamics of goods prices, net of taxes, around the 
steady state. The parameter 
1 ) 1 )( 1 (
− − − ≡ θ βθ θ λ
θ − 1  quantifies the share of firms resetting prices in period  .  t
    The log deviation of real marginal costs,  , can be replaced as  . 
If we insert the labor supply equation (10b) and subsequently replace   by the production 
function   and   by equation (13) we obtain 
* ˆ t c m
* * * * ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ t t t t a p w c m − − =
* ˆt n
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as the marginal cost equation for the monetary union aggregate around its steady state.                
  102.4 The small economy in monetary union 
The small economy has no impact on the union aggregate dynamics of output and inflation. 
But aggregate variables affect the small member country. Total demand for domestically pro-
duced goods is the sum of domestic household demand for domestically produced goods, do-
mestic public demand and export demand    
(17)  .   t t H t H t G C C Y + + =
*
, ,
Log-linearizing the output equation (17) around the steady state gives us 
(18)   .  () () () t t H t H t g c c y ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ 1 1 ˆ
*
, , γ γ α γ α + − + − − =
We can now insert the demand function (4b) as well as the equivalent function for export de-




, ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ t t t H t H c p p c + − − = η . Together with equation (5) and  , which assumes 
the absence of transport costs and price discrimination, we obtain 
*
, t t F p p =
() () ()( ) ( )( ) t t H t t t t g p p c c y ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 2 ˆ 1 ˆ 1 1 ˆ ,
* * γ γ αη α γ α γ α + − − − + − + − − = .     
Finally, we use equation (11) derived from perfect risk sharing to replace domestic household 
consumption,  . This gives us  t c ˆ








































* * , 
with  () ( ) 1 2 1 − − + ≡ ησ α α ωα , for aggregate demand in the small open economy inside 
monetary union. Replacing   by equation (13) and assuming the steady state share of public 
spending to GDP to be identical in the small country and the union aggregate we obtain 
* ˆt c








































* * * . 
The supply side combines monopolistic competition with staggered price setting in the goods 
market, and a competitive labor market. Inflation thus follows a New Keynesian Phillips 
curve analogous to equation (15) for the monetary union block. We have  
(20)  t t H t t H c m E ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 , , λ π β π + = +   
for domestic goods prices net of consumption taxes. Real marginal costs are affected by labor 
supply and technology. Inserting equations (5) and (10a) and replacing   by the production 
function   gives 
t n ˆ
t t t n a y ˆ ˆ ˆ + =
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In two further steps we first substitute   by equation (11) and then replace the terms of trade, 
, by the aggregate demand equation (19) to obtain marginal costs as 
t c ˆ
t H t p p ,
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equals the marginal costs equation in Herz et al. (2005). Without income and consumption 
taxes and assuming  1 = =σ η  the expression simplifies to 
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which is the marginal cost equation for the small open economy in Galí/ Monacelli (2005).    
  12Finally we can replace foreign household consumption,  , by the union’s resource 
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The marginal cost equation (22) is identical to the marginal cost equation for the small open 
economy in Herz et al. (2005). 
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The small economy: 
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Table 1: The model in deviations from the steady state 
Equation (22) illustrates the impact of taxation and government spending on marginal costs 
  13and aggregate supply. Both income and consumption taxes lower the real wage. They thus 
increase marginal production costs, as indicated by the positive sign in (22), and reduce labor 
supply. An increase in government spending reduces private wealth and lifetime private con-
sumption. As consumption decreases the marginal utility of consumption relative to leisure 
increases. Consequently, private households increase their labor supply. The increase in labor 
supply lowers the marginal production costs, which is indicated by the negative sign on gov-
ernment consumption in equation (22).     
2.5 Output under flexible prices and the output gap 
The output gap 
f
t t t y y y ˆ ˆ ~ − ≡  indicates the percentage deviation of output from its natural 
level, i.e. from the equilibrium level in the absence of nominal rigidities and conditional on 
foreign demand. Each firm adjusts prices in every period and charges a constant mark-up un-
der perfectly flexible prices. Additionally we assume that the flexible-price equilibrium also 
coincides with the economy’s efficient level of production. Monopolistic competition leads to 
an inefficiently low level of production. We therefore assume that the government pays an 
employment subsidy to firms in order to offset the distortionary markup effect on output. If 
the employment subsidy offsets the markup distortion, the flexible-price equilibrium equals 
the efficient level of output. Closing the output gap then also achieves the efficient level of 
production (see e.g. Galí and Monacelli 2002, Woodford 2003).       
    Under flexible prices real marginal costs do not deviate from their steady-state level, 
i.e.  . For the deviation of real marginal costs from the flexible-price level we thus 
obtain  . We can therefore determine the fluctuation of poten-
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    If we subtract the marginal costs under flexible prices from the actual deviation of 
marginal costs from the steady state   and define  ˆˆ ˆ 0
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where we assume  ,   and the exogeneity of foreign country variables. The New 
Keynesian Phillips curve now reads  
f
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    To relate aggregate demand to the output gap we subtract the output level under flexi-
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If we assume that both taxes rates and public spending are kept at their steady-state levels as 
  15long as economic activity achieves its flexible-price equilibrium, we have  . 
First differencing the previous equation gives us the change in the output gap as 
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summarizes the exogenous disturbances to the output-gap equation. 
    The equations (25) and (27) describe the change of domestic goods prices net of taxes 
and the change of the output gap in the small open economy inside the monetary union. Fiscal 
policy affects both the supply and the demand side. As shown in equation (10), the supply-
side effects result from the impact of fiscal policy on labor supply. Taxing consumption and 
labor income reduces the real wage, i.e. the opportunity cost of leisure. The resulting decline 
in the labor supply raises the marginal costs of production. An increase in public consump-
tion, on the other hand, reduces private wealth. Given the decreasing marginal utility of con-
sumption, the reduction of household wealth reduces real wages and marginal costs for a 
given level of production. 
    The demand effects of fiscal policy rest upon public expenditure and consumption 
taxes. Government expenditure is a component of aggregate demand itself. Changes in the 
consumption tax affect the behavior of optimizing households. A VAT reduction triggers an 
increase in private consumption, whereas a tax increase compresses private demand. The ef-
fect positively depends on the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. The resulting impact 
  16on domestic output is furthermore a function of the share of domestic output in domestic pri-
vate demand.   
2.6 Monetary and fiscal policy 
Monetary policy stabilizes output and inflation in the union as a whole. We assume that the 
central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate according to 
(28)  . 
* * * ˆ ˆ
t t i π φπ =
It thus follows a monetary policy rule, where nominal interest rates react to changes in aggre-
gate inflation. Idiosyncratic shocks to the small open economy have no significant impact on 
the union aggregate. Therefore they do not affect monetary policy decisions.      
    Fiscal policy in the small economy attempts to dampen asymmetric business cyclical 
fluctuations. The optimal policy aims at minimizing the expected loss given by the function 
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with   as the change in the fiscal instrument. The quadratic loss function can be derived as 
the quadratic approximation to household utility around the steady state. Woodford (2003) 
provides a detailed exposition for the closed economy. Galí and Monacelli (2002) derive the 
quadratic loss function for the small open economy case. Benigno and Woodford (2003) show 
that changes in distortionary taxation should not per se enter the welfare criterion. Many loss 
specifications for monetary policy do also include a positive weight on instrument changes, 
however (see Dieppe et al. 2005). The main motivation for including interest rate changes in 
the loss function is to reconcile the empirical finding of high interest rate smoothing with the 
assumption of optimizing monetary policy. The importance of credibility, model uncertainty 
t f Δ
  17and the destabilization of financial markets are theoretical arguments against frequent and 
strong interest rates changes. For fiscal policy   may furthermore reflect political econ-
omy factors. Under the current institutional setting fiscal policy is more exposed to political 
pressures and to longer delays in reaction or implementation than monetary policy.
0 > f q
2      
    The implementation lag of fiscal policy figures among the most prominent objections 
against the use of fiscal instruments for short-term macroeconomic stabilization.
3 In contrast 
to previous work on fiscal stabilization (e.g., van Aarle et al. 2004, Beetsma and Jensen 2002, 
Galí and Monacelli 2004) we explicitly account for a delayed implementation of fiscal meas-
ures. We adopt the simple rule   
(30)  ,1 ty t s H t sf t f yf π φ φπ φ −− =+ + % − , 
whereby   designates the fiscal instrument. If  t f 0 s = , fiscal policy reacts contemporaneously 
to output and inflation. If  , it reacts to macroeconomic fluctuations with a one-period 
delay. Comparing the results for 
1 s =
0 s =  and  1 s =  allows us to investigate whether a one-
period delay in implementation weakens the stabilizing potential of fiscal policy in our model 
of inter-temporal optimizing households and firms.    
    Our analysis in chapter four focuses on optimal simple rules. Simple rules are easy to 
monitor and easy to understand. They reduce the government’s incentive to deviate ex post 
from the ex ante optimal plan. If the announcement was lacking credibility, the reaction func-
tion would have little stabilizing effect on private-sector expectations. Giving an easy-to-
                                                 
2 To facilitate comparison among the different fiscal instruments we let   refer to percentage-point changes of 





− − ≡ Δ f f f f t t t  we can write the relationship between percentage-point and percentage changes as 
f f f f f t t t ˆ
1 Δ = − ≡ Δ − . 
  18monitor reaction function simple rules thus attenuate the time-consistency problem attached 
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Table 2: The output gap, inflation and fiscal policy in the small open economy 
We summarize the small open economy model in table 2. The model consists of the output 
gap equation, the inflation equation and the fiscal rule. The output gap equation is conditional 
on foreign demand and changes in technology or household preferences. The New Keynesian 
Phillips curve is augmented by a cost push shock. As the economy is small, we do not have 
any feedback from the country dynamics to the monetary union aggregate.          
2.7 Stability analysis 
Inflation in the small open economy follows the New Keynesian Phillips curve in table 2. Its 
dynamic is forward looking. The output gap is backward looking, on the other hand. Stability 
and determinacy of the equilibrium thus requires one eigenvalue of the system to be smaller 
than one and one eigenvalue to be larger than one. Investigating the dynamics without policy 
intervention and neglecting the white-noise disturbance terms, we can rewrite the two equa-
tions as 
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3 Other concerns relate to the insufficient reversibility of fiscal measures and to the long-run budgetary sustain-
ability. Compared to monetary policy the fiscal impact lag appears to be rather short, however (see Blinder 
2004).   t H t t a y y , 1
~ ~ π − = −  and 
t t H t t H y b E ~
1 , , + = + π β π , 
with   and  ()
1 1















    If we take first differences of the inflation equation and then insert the output equation 


















Following the approach of Sargent (1987), we can factorize the expression in brackets into 
() () 0 1 1 2 , 2 1 = − − + t H L L π δ δ , with  ( )
1
2 1 1
− + + ≡ + β β δ δ ab  and  . Combining the 
last two expressions, we obtain  . Because of   and the as-
sumption on the time preference rate 
1
2 1
− ≡ β δ δ
ab + + = +





− ≡ β δ δ
1 0 < < β  one of the eigenvalues has to be smaller then 
1 and the other to be larger than one in modulus. The stability and determinacy requirements 
are thus fulfilled. This means that stability and determinacy of equilibrium does not require 
fiscal stabilization under efficient financial markets, i.e. perfect risk sharing, in a monetary 
union. Chapter four discusses the extent to which fiscal policy can smooth the adjustment to 
exogenous shocks. The scenario without stabilization policy provides a useful benchmark.   
3 Model  calibration 
In section 2 we have developed the intertemporal-optimization model and discussed the quali-
tative impact of fiscal policy on aggregate demand and supply. We now calibrate the equa-
tions in table 1 in order to quantitatively assess the stabilizing performance of fiscal policy 
  20rules and to retrieve impulse responses to exogenous distortions. Table 2 summarizes the pa-
rameter values. 
Parameter Symbol  Value 
Discount factor  β   0.99 
Elasticity of labor supply 
1 − ϕ   0.67 
Elasticity of substitution between commodity bundles  η  1.00 
Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 
1 − σ   1.00 
Sensitivity of inflation to marginal costs  λ   0.09 
Steady-state ratio of exports to GDP  α   0.55 
Steady-state ratio of public consumption to GDP  γ   0.27 
Steady-state tax rate on consumption 
* c c τ τ =   0.20 
Steady state tax rate on labor income 
* w w τ τ =   0.26 
Table 3: Model calibration 
A time period corresponds to a quarter of a year. The (non-weighted) average shares of pri-
vate and government consumption relative to GDP in the small EMU economies Austria, 
Belgium, Greece, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal are 0.55 and 0.20 respec-
tively. As we do not separately account for investment expenditure, we scale these consump-
tion shares to add up to one. The average ratio of exports to GDP for these countries is 0.55 
(see European Commission 2003). The average income tax and VAT rates amount to 26% 
and 20% respectively (see OECD 2004).
4  The remaining parameters values rely on standard 
choices. We set the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution to one, as in Clarida et al. (2000),   
the inverse of the labor supply elasticity to  5 . 1 = ϕ , as in Galí and Monacelli (2002). In ac-
cordance with Galí and Monacelli (2004) we also assume the elasticity of substitution be-
  21tween domestic and foreign commodity bundles to equal one. The value  75 . 0 = θ  for the 
probability of price non-adjustment implies an average contract length of one year and 
matches empirical observations (see Taylor, 1998). Together with  99 . 0 = β  we obtain 
086 . 0 = λ , which is close to the EMU estimate of 0.09 in Galí et al. (2001). Table 4 displays 
the model equations under these parameter choices. We thereby consider the fiscal instru-
ments in percentage-point deviations from their respective steady-state levels.      
() () ,, 0.73 0.27
cc
tH t t t yg g y t π ττ ε Δ= Δ − − − Δ − + Δ %  
()( ) ( ) ,, 1 0.99 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.03
ww cc
Ht t Ht t t t t Ey g g π πτ τ + =+ − − + − + % τ τ −  
, t y ts H ts f ts f yf π φ φπ φ −− =+ + % −  
Table 4: The calibrated model equations 
We consider the model dynamics in response to an autoregressive technology shock. We 
specify deviations of the technology parameter from its steady state as 
1, ˆ ˆˆ ta t a aa t ρ ε − =+ . 
We assume an AR (1) parameter  0.82 a ρ =  and 0.63 standard deviations for the innovation   
, ˆat ε . These values are in line with the euro-area estimates of Smeets and Wouters (2003). The 
output shock in equation (27) then becomes  ( ) , ˆ 1 yt t a α εϕ ω ≡ −+ Θ. We treat the shock as an 
asymmetric disturbance that only hits the small economy, and we assume that the monetary-
union aggregate is in its steady state. There is no spill-over from the small country to the ag-
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4 We take the average VAT and labor income tax rate for the small EMU economies in 2003 to proxy the steady 
state level of indirect and direct taxation. gregate monetary union. We use DYNARE and its optimization tool (see Juillard 1996) to 
derive simple optimal instrument rules and to calculate the model’s theoretical moments.
5
 
4  Simple optimal rules 
The optimal policy minimizes the loss function (29) given the equations (25) and (27). Its 
implementation faces two potential problems, however. Firstly, full optimization requires the 
policy maker to have perfect knowledge about the model structure. The second problem is the 
time consistency of optimal policy under delayed implementation. Simple policy rules can 
mitigate both problems (see Levin et al. 1999, Taylor 1999). They require less information 
about the economic environment, and they are less vulnerable to variations in economic struc-
ture.
6 Furthermore, simple rules are easy to understand and transparent. The commitment to a 
simple rule is thus easier to observe and to implement than the commitment to the fully opti-
mal plan (see Beetsma and Jensen 2002, Dieppe et al. 2005). We focus our discussion on 
simple rules of the form (30). Fiscal policy reacts to the output gap and to inflation in domes-
tic goods prices. For   the reaction is contemporaneous, i.e. without implementation lag. 
For   the rule implies a one-period delay in the reaction to macroeconomic fluctuations. 
Rule (30) furthermore allows for instrument smoothing.  
0 s =
1 s =
Before we derive the optimal coefficients for the policy rule (30) we need to specify 
the relative weights in the loss function (29). We consider two different combinations of pa-
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5 The DYNARE routine is freely available and can be downloaded from http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare. 
6 Taylor (1999) and Levine et al. (1999) illustrate in a monetary policy model that policies, which are optimal in 
a specific macroeconomic model, may perform poorly in a modified economic environment. Levine et al. (1999) 
conclude that “even in large models with hundreds of variables, three variables (the current output gap, the cur-
rent four-quarter average inflation rate, and the lagged funds rate) summarize nearly all the information relevant 
to setting the federal funds rate efficiently”.                 rameters. The first scenario sets  1 = π q  and  1 . 0 = = f y q q . This choice of coefficients corre-
sponds to the high relative weight of inflation in the micro-funded loss function of New 
Keynesian models (see Galí and Monacelli 2005, Woodford 2003). For the discount factorβ  
converging to one the overall loss approximately amounts to 
(31a)     () ( ) ( ) f y L H Δ + + = var 1 . 0 var ~ var 1 . 0 π , 
i.e. the weighted sum of the variances of the output gap, the domestic commodity-price infla-
tion and the adjustment of the fiscal instrument.  
    Other research, as van Aarle et al. 2004, however argues from an empirical perspective 
that fiscal policy focuses more on output stabilization.
7 The common central bank already 
stabilizes aggregate inflation and inflationary expectations at the union level. Therefore we 
also consider optimal simple rules for  1 y q =  and  0.1 f qq π = = , which gives the loss function     
(31b)     () ( ) ( ) f y L H Δ + + = var 1 . 0 var 1 . 0 ~ var π , 
where the weight on the output gap is ten times higher than the weight on inflation. A com-
parison of the optimal rules for both loss specifications allows to investigate the robustness of 
simple optimal rules with respect to differences in policy objectives.   
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7 For an empirical foundation of the loss function one could also consider rule estimates for the Euro area and 
search for the loss function that they fit best. Estimates of monetary reaction functions include Clarida et al. 
(1998), Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2004), Gerberding et al. (2004) and Muscatelli et al. (2004, 2004a). Dennis 
(2003), Favero and Rovelli (2002), Mayer (2003) and Söderström et al. (2002) provide empirically estimated 
loss functions for US monetary policy since the 1980s. Their results are very heterogeneous, and they strongly 
depend on the underlying methodology, however. 4.1  Optimal simple instrument rules  
This section presents numerical simulations for optimal simple policy rules under an autore-
gressive productivity shock. We compare the stabilization performance of the rules to the 
benchmark case without fiscal stabilization.  
 
Figure 1: Impulse responses without stabilization policy 
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses under a persistent technology shock and without stabi-
lization policy.  The positive technology shock (a) increases output and consumption under 
flexible prices (y_eff and c_eff). The nominal rigidities delay the reaction of actual output and 
private consumption and cause a negative output and consumption gap (y_gap and c_gap).
8 
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8 To determine the consumption gap we first calculate the efficient level of consumption from equation (11) in 
combination with equation (5). The efficient level is the level of consumption for  , ˆ
f
H t p  and  ˆ
cf
t τ . We can calcu-
late the flexible-price level by solving (26) for  , ˆ
f
H t p . We then subtract actual from efficient consumption. We The negative output gap leads to a temporary decline in domestic commodity prices and to 
temporarily negative inflation rates. The country’s real net exports (tb) slightly increase.
9 The 
increase in private consumption increases the country’s import demand, but the technology 
shock also improves the international competitiveness of domestic commodities. Given our 
model calibration the competitiveness effect prevails and leads to a temporary increase in net 
exports. 
    The tables 5 to 8 present the coefficients of the optimal simple instrument rules. The 
tables 5 and 6 illustrate the optimal contemporaneous reaction to output and price-level vola-
tility. The tables 7 and 8 report the results for fiscal rules with a one-period implementation 
lag. The tables 5 and 7 contain the optimal coefficients for the inflation-dominated loss func-
tion (31a). The tables 6 and 8 give the simple optimal rules for the output-dominated loss 
function (31b).     
         y φ   π φ   f φ   y σ   c σ   π σ   f Δ σ   Loss 
No stabilization  -  -  -  0.50  0.31  0.24  -  0.08 
Public spending  -1.41  -0.59  1.23  0.24  0.40  0.14  0.33  0.06 
Consumption  tax  0.17 1.10 0.97 0.40 0.56 0.21 0.30 0.07 
Income tax  -0.22  -0.48  0.77  0.59  0.36  0.18  0.19  0.07 
Table 5: Optimal simple rule for inflation-dominated loss function (σ  indicates standard deviations) 
                                                                                                                                                          
assume that foreign country variables are exogenous, and that fiscal policy variables remain at their steady-state 















f  and  tt t c ≡− %
, t
cc .    
9 Real net exports are defined as 
*
, tH t F XMC C =− . Linearizing the expression via a first-order Taylor expan-
sion and inserting the demand function (4a) as well as the equivalent for foreign household yields 
() () () () (
2 *
,, ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 11 1




γη α α α γ ⎡⎤ =− − − − + − − ⎣⎦ c c . Our simulation assumes that foreign 
price and consumption levels attain their respective steady state, i.e. 
*
, ˆˆ 0 Ft t pc = = .       y φ   π φ   f φ   y σ   c σ   π σ   f Δ σ   Loss 
No stabilization  -  -  -  0.50  0.31  0.24  -  0.25 
Public spending  -7.47  -0.08  0.73  0.05  0.37  0.16  0.44  0.02 
Consumption  tax  2.48 0.36 0.73 0.26 0.74 0.19 0.74 0.13 
Income  tax  0.74 0.61 0.78 0.38 0.23 0.35 0.51 0.18 
Table 6: Optimal simple rule for output-dominated loss function (σ  indicates standard deviations) 
Fiscal policy reduces macroeconomic volatility in all four scenarios. In every case the value 
of the loss function is lower than the loss without stabilization policy. Anti-cyclical govern-
ment spending is the most efficient stabilization tool, on average. Under the output-dominated 
loss function, the contemporaneous spending rule achieves a particularly high stabilization 
gain and brings the output-gap volatility close to zero (see table 6). However, the anti-cyclical 
spending rule increases the volatility of private consumption around its efficient level. The 
result is compatible with the findings in Andrés et al. (2003, 2004) and Galí et al. (2004) and 
due to the composition effect. Public consumption is itself a component of aggregate demand. 
The anti-cyclical adjustment of government spending hence directly reduces the volatility of 
output without stabilizing private sector demand. The positive technology shock induces an 
increase in efficient output and leads to a negative output gap. The optimal expenditure rule 
reacts through an increase in public consumption, which narrows the output gap. The increase 
in public expenditure furthermore reduces the marginal costs of production. The coefficients 
in table 4 illustrate that the deflationary negative wealth effect of increasing government 
spending is overcompensated by the price-level effect of the increase in output and the reduc-
tion of the output gap, however. 
    The stabilizing potential of the fiscal instruments is more similar in the three other 
scenarios illustrated in the tables 5, 7 and 8. The optimal coefficients point to a relatively ag-
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gressive reaction of government spending to output gaps and price-level changes. The high 
coefficient values do not imply particularly strong adjustments of expenditure levels in the 
process of shock absorption, however. The income tax only affects labor supply and the mar-
ginal costs of production in our model of inter-temporal optimization without liquidity con-
straints. As it only enters the Phillips curve equation it appears particularly well suited for the 
selective stabilization of commodity prices. The results in the tables 5 and 7 confirm that the 
income-tax rule is better suited for price-level than for output stabilization. The positive tech-
nology shock causes downward pressure on commodity prices. The optimal reaction triggers 
a temporary increase in income-tax rates. The tax increase reduces the real wage and the labor 
supply, so that marginal production costs increase. For the output-dominated loss function 
(31b) the signs of the optimal coefficients change (see tables 6 and 8). The positive technol-
ogy shock and the negative output gap here induce a reduction of income taxes. The resulting 
decrease of production costs improves the international competitiveness of domestic com-
modities. Furthermore, domestic households increase private consumption in response to the 
price-level decline (see equation 11). Consequently, the demand for domestic production in-
creases and narrows the output gap. Contrary to the two other instruments, the income tax 
also stabilizes private consumption in tables 6 and 8. Thirdly, the optimal consumption-tax 
rule implies a reduction of the tax rate in response to the negative values of the output gap and 
of inflation in the aftermath of the positive technology shock. The temporary tax cut induces 
optimizing households to increase current relative to future consumption. It leads to an in-
crease in domestic demand and reduces the output gap. Somewhat surprisingly, the optimal 
consumption-tax rule increases the volatility of private consumption around its efficient level. 
The increase in volatility follows from equation (11). The rate adjustment induced by the op-
timal rule leads to an overshooting of consumption relative to the efficient level. The loss re-
duction under the consumption-tax rule results from its stabilizing impact on the demand for domestic commodities. It increases domestic demand and temporarily improves the interna-
tional competitiveness of domestic production.            
  y φ   π φ   f φ   y σ   c σ   π σ   f Δ σ   Loss 
No stabilization  -  -  -  0.50  0.31  0.24  -  0.08 
Public spending  -0.30  -0.56  0.90  0.46  0.36  0.18  0.24  0.06 
Consumption  tax  0.03 0.82 0.93 0.47 0.42 0.22 0.20 0.07 
Income tax  -0.16  -0.47  0.75  0.56  0.35  0.20  0.17  0.07 
Table 7: Optimal simple rule for inflation-dominated loss function and implementation lag 
  y φ   π φ   f φ   y σ   c σ   π σ   f Δ σ   Loss 
No stabilization  -  -  -  0.50  0.31  0.24  -  0.25 
Public spending  -0.31  -0.52  0.48  0.42  0.34  0.20  0.25  0.19 
Consumption  tax  0.30 1.22 0.60 0.45 0.42 0.22 0.39 0.22 
Income  tax  0.64 0.51 0.66 0.42 0.26 0.32 0.42 0.19 
Table 8: Optimal simple rule for output-dominated loss function and implementation lag 
Comparing the results for inflation-dominated and output-dominated loss specifications re-
veals further interesting results. The comparison between the tables 5 and 7, on the one hand, 
and 6 and 8, on the other hand, shows that the optimal inflation stabilization implies stronger 
policy persistence, i.e. a bigger  f φ , than the optimal rule for output stabilization. The result is 
compatible with the results in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) on super-persistent interest 
rate rules. The optimality of high policy persistence is a consequence of the purely forward-
looking nature of inflation in our model. High policy persistence anchors and stabilizes infla-
tionary expectations, which in turn dampens current inflation. The output equation does not 
contain a forward-looking component. The optimal degree of persistence is therefore much 
  29lower for the output-dominated loss specification.  
    The difference between the forward-looking nature of inflation and the backward-
looking output-gap equation also explains, why the one-period implementation lag does 
hardly impact on inflation stabilization, but substantially weakens the output-stabilization 
performance (see tables 7 and 8). The lagged implementation of the tax-rate or expenditure 
adjustment stabilizes the private sector’s inflationary expectations and thus also reduces cur-
rent price-level fluctuations. As the output equation does not contain a forward component, 
the lagged implementation has no direct impact on the current output gap. However, the 
lagged reaction reduces at least future output gaps under the persistent shock. 
    A third finding in this respect is that the optimal simple rule for lagged output stabili-
zation reacts less to the output gap and relatively stronger to inflation than the optimal con-
temporaneous rule (see tables 6 and 8). The logic behind this shift from  y φ  to  π φ  is again that 
the lagged reaction stabilizes current output primarily by its impact on inflationary expecta-
tions and the current price level, whereas the contemporaneous rule directly impacts on cur-
rent demand.     
4.2  The combination of fiscal instruments 
In the previous paragraph, we have considered a single-instrument approach, i.e. the use of 
only one instrument at one time. We can also combine fiscal instruments, however. Therefore 
we now investigate whether the combined use of two instrument decisively improves on the 
stabilization potential of fiscal policy. We simultaneously optimize simple instrument rules 
for government spending and income taxation and for consumption and income taxes. We 
consider the income tax as the complementary instrument because it only has supply-side ef-
fects and allows to target labor supply and production costs selectively. We can therefore ex-
  30press any possible combination of demand and supply-side effects as a linear combination of  
public spending or consumption taxes, on the one hand, and the income tax, on the other 
hand. Table 9 presents the optimal coefficients for the inflation-dominated loss function. Ta-
ble 10 summarizes the result for a high relative weight on output stabilization.      
  y φ   π φ   f φ   y σ   c σ   π σ   f Δ σ   Loss 
Public spending  -1.61  -0.19  0.96  0.36 
Income tax  0.00  -2.20  1.00 
0.22 0.59 0.00 
0.86 
0.03 
Consumption tax  0.81  -0.44  0.86  0.31 
Income tax  -0.37  -0.24  0.83 
0.47 0.65 0.14 
0.20 
0.06 
Table 9: Simultaneous optimization for inflation-dominated loss function 
  y φ   π φ   f φ   y σ   c σ   π σ   f Δ σ   Loss 
Public spending  -7.45  -0.13  0.74  0.49 
Income tax  0.00  -0.13  1.00 
0.06 0.51 0.06 
0.55 
0.02 
Consumption tax  3.07  -0.65  0.73  0.64 
Income tax  0.33  0.74  0.76 
0.25 0.55 0.26 
0.28 
0.12 
Table 10: Simultaneous optimization for output-dominated loss function 
Table 9 shows that the combined use of government-spending and income-taxation rules can 
reduce the inflation-dominated loss by about one half when compared to the single-instrument 
policy. The income tax only reacts to changes in the price level, whereas the weight of infla-
tion decreases in the spending rule. The combination of both instruments achieves a perfect 
price level stabilization. Additionally, it slightly reduces output volatility compared to table 6. 
The combination of both instruments provides only minor benefits under the output-
dominated loss function (see table 10). Output stabilization is comparable to the government-
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spending rule in table 6. The combined use of consumption and income taxes under the infla-
tion-dominated loss function improves price-level stabilization at the cost of higher output 
and consumption volatility (see table 9). The simultaneous optimization under the output-
dominated loss specification reduces output and consumption gaps, whereas price-level fluc-
tuations increase, however (see table 10). Taken together, the simultaneous optimization of 
the public-expenditure and the income-tax rule under the inflation-dominated loss function 
achieves the biggest loss reduction compared to the single-instrument approach. In all other 
cases, the gains from simultaneous optimization are fairly limited.      
                            
5 Conclusions 
This paper analyses fiscal policy in a micro-founded New Keynesian model of a small open 
economy inside a monetary union. We model the impact of government expenditure, con-
sumption taxes and income taxes on aggregate demand and supply. Instead of limiting our-
selves to the budget surplus as a global indicator of the fiscal stance, we analyze direct taxes, 
indirect taxes and public spending separately. All these instruments differ in the way they 
affect the optimum conditions and the behavior of private households and firms. Within the 
dynamic model we then investigate the potential of fiscal instruments to stabilize macroeco-
nomic fluctuations at the country level. The substitution and wealth effects allow for fiscal 
stabilization even in our setting of infinitely-lived Ricardian households. As the model con-
text does not imply income effects Under the deficit perspective fiscal policy is commonly 
assumed to be rather impotent in a Ricardian model without liquidity constraints as it does not 
imply strong income effects.    
  The model differs in several aspects from the closed-economy New Keynesian model.   33
The common monetary policy, which stabilizes the union aggregate, ensures equilibrium sta-
bility and determinacy also in the small member economy. Fiscal policy can nevertheless 
achieve a substantial reduction of business cycle fluctuations. Concerning the transmission 
mechanism, the main difference between fiscal and monetary policy in our model is that the 
former has both direct demand and supply-side effects, whereas the later only affects demand 
directly. Consequently, fiscal policy enters both the output and the Phillips curve equation. 
We then investigate optimal simple rules for fiscal stabilization under a persistent 
technology shock. We determine optimal rules for an inflation-dominated and for an output-
dominated loss function. We also compare the contemporaneous reaction to output and infla-
tion to policy rules featuring an implementation lag. The simple optimal expenditure rule out-
performs the consumption-tax and the income-tax rule for both the inflation-dominated and 
the output-dominated loss function because of its direct demand-driven impact on the output 
gap. The stabilization gain from anti-cyclical spending is especially pronounced for output-
dominated loss specifications. An implementation lag has little impact on the potential of fis-
cal policy for price-level stabilization, but it deteriorates the performance for output stabiliza-
tion. Inflation-dominated loss specifications imply a higher instrument persistence than the 
optimal output-dominated rules. The implementation lag generally leads to less aggressive 
coefficient values and to a shift in the relative weights of coefficients from the output gap to 
inflation. The simultaneous optimization of government-spending and income-taxation rules 
significantly lowers the inflation-dominated loss and achieves a perfect price level stabiliza-
tion. In all other cases, there are only small benefits from a simultaneous optimization of two 
instrument rules compared to the optimal single-instrument approach.          
  Our model assumes inter-temporally optimizing households and firms and an inte-
grated capital market with perfect international risk sharing. The sustainability of public fi-  34
nances does not impair business-cycle stabilization if policy affects the private sector primar-
ily via the substitution rather than via its income effects. For simplicity, we furthermore as-
sume that lump-sum transfers are available to balance the government budget.  
Considering the case, where the government has to rely on distortionary taxes or ex-
penditure cuts to balance its budget, would be an interesting modification. Another extension 
consists would be to investigate the stabilizing potential of fiscal policy under deviations from 
inter-temporal optimization. To this aim, one may model the private sector as an aggregate of 
inter-temporally optimizing households and Keynesian rule-of-thumb consumers that simply 
consume the current disposable income (see Mankiw, 2000, Galí et al., 2004). The income 
effects of taxation and government spending increase in this setting, whereas the substitution 
effects of fiscal policy decline in importance.  
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